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In the first chapter of The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law, Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel make an
arresting statement:
... [P]eople who are backing their
beliefs with cash are correct; they
have every reason to avoid mistakes,
while critics (be they academics or
regulators) are rewarded for novel
rather than accurate beliefs. Market
professionals who estimate these
things wrongly suffer directly;
academics and regulators who
estimate wrongly do not pay a
similar penalty. Persons who wager
with their own money may be
wrong, but they are less likely to be
wrong than are academics and
regulators, who are wagering with
other peoples' money. 1

-

BY MERRITT

B. Fox

This essay is based on a speech delivered to
The] oumal of Corporation Law annual
banquet in Iowa City on March 4, 1994.
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In other words, society should trust
decisions to people who put their
money where their mouths are.
When I first read this passage, I was a
bit perturbed. Now that Easterbrook and
Fischel had published the book that
pulled together their many important
contributions to corporate law, it looked
like they wanted to put the rest of
academia out of business. More dispassionate reflection, however, reveals that
there is something to what they have
to say.
To start, Easterbrook and Fischel
certainly raise a critical issue: what is the
proper allocation of responsibility for
making economic decisions in a world
where the future is uncertain and
knowledge is dispersed unevenly? In
essence, they are asking how much
deference should be given to the views of
those who back up their views with cash
- the persons who think to be paid and how much to regulators and academics - those who are paid to think.
Regulators have well-catalogued vices.
Academics - the source of many
regulator ideas - have their faults as
well. During Robert Bork's ill-starred
Supreme Court confirmation hearings,
Senator Orin Hatch, asserting that Bork
did not fully believe some of the more
unpopular things that he put in his
academic writings, argued that Bork, as a
professor, "was paid to be provocative. "2

The anger that this alliterative phrase
aroused among academics suggests that it
hit the raw nerve of ambivalence between
their roles as direct seekers of truth and
as stimulators of intellect. Moreover,
while it may be more a product of
temperament and impecuniosity, academics do seem shy about
testing out their
theories with their
own money. It is
significant that John
Kenneth Galbraith,
a man famous for
believing in the
frequent foolishness
of businessmen and
the wisdom of at least
one academic,
chose fiction as
•
his way of exploring the possibility
of such a test. The

protagonist in Galbraith's 1990 novel,

A Tenured Professor, is a professor who
makes a fortune testing his contrarian
predictive model of the economy by using
it as a guide to investing in the stock
market. No evidence exists that Galbraith
has taken his fantasy to heart yet and
tried to do the same in his own life.
Nevertheless, Easterbrook and
Fischel's quoted passage requires more
critical examination. Their breezy style,
while promoting clarity and impact,
masks a number of assumptions, and we
need to exercise care in where we apply
their advice. The specific context in
which Easterbrook and Fischel make
their statement is as part of an argument
that legislatures and courts should give
great deference to the language of articles

of incorporation. An extensive amount of
literature suggests that the application of
their statement even to this issue needs
substantial qualification.3
But the statement is more broad
reaching than that and represents a core
element in their overall pro-market, antiregulatory philosophy; it obviously
invites rigorous theoretical analysis. In
this discussion, however, I am going to
examine its limitations in a more concrete way by relating it to three events
that have been in the financial news over
the last two years: (1) the allegations
against Prudential Securities in connection with the sale of limited partnerships
to the public in the 1980s; (2) the
conversion of mutual savings and loans
into banking corporations; and
(3) market makers' short sales of the
stocks of bankrupt firms at prices well
above what any informed observer
possibly could consider they were worth.

1. Frank H. Easterbrook &: Daniel R. Fischel,
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 31 (1991).
2. Linda Greenhouse, "Stakes of the Bork Fight:
With Senate Hearings Starting Tomorrow, Both
Sides Have Much to Gain or Lose," New York
Times, Sept. 14, 1987, at Al.
3. This argument was originally offered by Michael
Jensen &: William Meckling in 'Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure," 3 journal of Financial
Economics, 305, 312-19 (1976). They argue that
a corporation's articles of incorporation will
represent the best available set of constraints for
minimizing the agency costs of management.
This view is based on the idea that when a firm's
entrepreneurs initially offer shares to others, their
sale price accurately reflects the expected agency
costs implied in the terms chosen. I have
questioned elsewhere whether the market actually
takes note of such terms and accurately reflects
their implications, and even if it does, whether
articles of the corporations that dominate the
industrial sector (most of which issued the bulk of
their stock between 50 and 100 years ago), are
still agency cost-minimizing today. See Merritt B.
Fox, 'The Role of the Market Model in Corporate
Law Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White,"
76 California Law Review 101 5, 1041-42 (1988);
Merritt B. Fox, Finance and Industrial Performance

in a Dynamic Economy: Theory, Practice and Policy
140-143 (1987).
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THREE CASE STUDIES

A. Prudential Securities
Limited Partnerships
During the 1980s, Prudential Securities sold about $8 billion worth of limited
partnership interests to the public
through their brokers. Many of these
securities subsequently lost much or all
of their value. Prudential agreed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to pay an initial "down payment"
of $330 million into a settlement fund .
Some (perhaps optimistic) plaintiffs'
lawyers predict that Prudential ultimately
will have to pay as much as $3 billion
into this fund. 4 The crux of the complaint
against Prudential is that for a large
number of the purchasers, these investments were unsuitable. 5
The story has a couple of interesting
aspects. First, the whole idea of regulating the relationship between brokers and
customers with rules about suitability is
the very antithesis of respecting the
decisions of people who put their money
where their mouths are. Does that mean
that the suitability doctrine should be
eliminated? I suspect not, at least not in a
case like this. Based on reports in the
financial press, it appears that billions of
dollars of securities came into the hands
of people who, even viewed from the ex
ante perspective of the time of purchase,
would have been better off if they had
not bought the securities. Based upon the
best knowledge available at the time of
purchase, these securities had questionable expected rates of return. And, in any
event there was a mismatch between the
purchasers' low risk preferences and the
securities' high risk characteristics. These
did not just tum out to be bad deals in
the end; for these purchasers, they were
bad deals from the beginning.
The other point of interest relates to
the role of reputation in the models
which find unregulated markets make
superior decisions even in a world with
unequal distribution of information.
Somehow Prudential allowed the use of
4. See Scott J Paltrow, "Prudential to Pay at least
$3 71 Million in Fraud Settlement," Los Angeles
Times, Oct. 22, 1993, at Dl.
5.

Id. See also Sharon Walsh, "At Prudential, the
Fraud Case that Won't Die: Investigations of
Partnership Sales Continue Despite Huge
Settlements," Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1994,
at Hl.

6. Michael Quint, "Mutual Banks Moving to

Shareholder Owners," New York Times, June 1,
1993, at Dl.
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its rock solid trade name in a massive
way that gave customers confidence in
brokers who, in pursuit of high up-front
commissions, were pushing purchases of
securities quite contrary to the customers'
interests. As a result, "Prudential", as a
name for a securities company, has been
sufficiently sullied to become a bit of an
oxymoron.
Persons who worship market solutions
tend to assume that reputation-sullying
of this kind will rarely, if ever, occur.
These worshippers believe companies are
rational maximizers of share value.
Except in endgame situations, it is
irrational for a company to let such
sullying occur. Here, though, we have an
example of just that kind of irrationality
on a massive scale. Surely Prudential's
loss in reputational capital in the 1990s
greatly exceeds its additional profits from
pushing these securities in the 1980s.
Proponents of the market superiority
models underestimate the degree to
which intraorganizational dynamics lead
to this kind of irrationality and consequent social damage. Some businesses,
such as financial firms and law firms, are
based particularly on trust and cannot
operate successfully on a large scale
without substantial teputational capital.
One of the most difficult things for a
business of this sort to do is to set up a
system that creates incentives for its
individual members both to add to the
organization's profits and to act in a way
that preserves its reputation. The potential for failure in industries of this kind
creates a strong case for regulation.

B. Mutual Savings and
Loan Conversions
Now consider the conversions of
mutual savings and loans into banking
corporations that have been sweeping the
country for the last three or four years.
The mutual form of doing business where the institution is "owned" by its
depositors - appears to be outmoded.
Without shares, the organization lacks
both the carrots and the sticks necessary
to attain good managerial performance:
incentive plans are hard to design, and
ousting management for lax performance
is virtually impossible. It is also hard for
mutuals to raise new capital or arrange
mergers - serious problems in an era
when banking is showing sharply
increasing economies of scale.
Eliminating these problems by
converting to institutions with stock can
lead to significant increases in value.

The typical transaction involves an initial
offering of shares at a deep discount. The
average increase in price in the first few
weeks after the offering is somewhere
between 33 and 50 percent. 6 The opportunity and ability to participate in an
initial offering can, therefore, produce
riches.
The charters of these mutuals and the
statutes under which they operate appear
to give management enormous discretion
in determining who participates in the
offering, and, at least until recently,
regulators have taken a relatively handsoff approach. As a result, management
structured some deals so that only
members of management and employees
participate, thereby resembling the most
criticized Eastern European
privatizations. Others are designed to
permit depositors to participate. In many
of these cases, however, a large portion of
the shares go to "professional" depositors.
Professional depositors are persons who,
sensing the trend, travel around the
country placing small deposits in every
mutual they can find. When the deals are
announced, these city slicker depositors
have the knowledge and resources to
grab a big hunk of the shares. How the
gains from these conversions should
most appropriately be split up among
managers, long-term local depositors,
and recent out-of-town city slicker
depositors is not immediately obvious.
I am confident, however, that solid
academic analysis using the best theoretical tools available could significantly
illuminate this question.
Surely, the long-term local depositors
were not consciously affirming an
arrangement which permitted conversion
gains to benefit others when they put
their money where their mouths were.
Nor has such an arrangement really
proven to be the best structure by any
other market test. The impression of
unfairness is great, particularly in deals
where all or a substantial portion of the
discount shares are given to the managers. The managers' laxness under the
mutual arrangement, after all, created
much of the opportunity for gain from
the conversion. The public views these
deals as leftovers from the greed decade
of the 1980s, and the economy is not
well-served by this perception. A more
thoughtful approach to regulation would
either give local, long-time depositors
more of the gains, or provide a convincing, understandable rationale as to why
failing to develop such a plan is not
unfair.

C. Short Sales of Bankrupt
Firm Equities

Finally, consider the trading of the
shares of bankrupt companies such as
LTV after court confirmation of reorganization plans that provided the old equity
holders with nothing but a very small
tidbit. In the LTV case, a market maker
in the stock sold it short in an amount so
large that the short sales exceeded the
total number of outstanding shares. 7
Despite this massive short selling, the
price stayed several times higher than
what any well-informed investor would
pay. There were clearly a lot of willing
buyers - persons who put their money
where their mouths were - who thought
a possibility of a turnaround at LTV still
existed. Obviously, they were either
unaware of the confirmation of the
bankruptcy plan or could not understand
its significance. In this situation, where
the short selling market maker was sure
to win and the buyers sure to lose, the
Exchange, while grumbling and wringing
its hands, refused to act. It let trading
continue.
Again, a minimally diligent regulator
would know enough to see that stopping
trading would be a superior result for the
buyers, even if that meant overruling the
judgment of those who were backing
their beliefs with cash. The president of
the market maker, when asked why he
thought there was such a hue and cry
about his practices, answered "jealousy;"
he suggested that it was not too late for
others to become members of the
Chicago exchange so that they could
follow his example, after judicial confirmation of the next major bankrupt
company's reorganization plan.8 Events
like these erode confidence in the market
bit by bit, as an increasing number of
people, either through direct experience
or observing others, conclude that the
market is nothing more than a place
where sharp traders separate the perpetually hopeful from their money.

state of affairs. The conversion of mutual
savings and loans is an excellent example.
Additionally, academics, as the people
paid to be provocative, are society's
bulwark against its common tendency to
engage in "group think." Group think
afflicts markets just as it does any other
social institution. Many situations exist
where people figure out that a particular
group thought is wrong and are not able
to trade profitably on that discovery or,
even if they can, are not able to fully
correct the market price through their
actions. Prices are set by speculators.
Successful speculation is the result of
outguessing the competition on what the
market will think next. The best guide to
that may or may not be economic
fundamentals. Obviously, economic
fundamentals were not the best guide in
the case of LTV stock. 9
Regulators have a comparative advantage over market participants with
decisions involving the following, not
uncommon, collective action problems:
(1) for many individual private transactors, more work than they find worthwhile is required to be sufficiently
informed to have a reasonably accurate
view of the future, (2) there is reason to
think that this work 9ther will not be
done privately by anyone or, if it is, that
the results will not be fully and rapidly
incorporated into market price (full
and rapid incorporation protects the
uninformed and informed alike), and
(3) everyone's preferences and circumstances are sufficiently similar that, if in
fact they all were informed, most people
would decide the same way.
The continued trading of the LTV
shares is again a good example. It took
work to figure out the true value of these

shares, work that many investors did not
find worthwhile to undertake. The true
value was not reflected in price, and no
one would have wanted these shares at
anything approaching the price paid if
they had done the work to figure out their
true value.

Rf lfVANCf TO
CORPORATf lAWYf RS
The ideas discussed here have, by way of
analogy, significance to the editors and staff
of the journal of Corporation Law and others
who will become the next generation of
corporate lawyers. Easterbrook and Fischel's
statement represents an overly cynical view
of the personal and social value of professionalism. You, too, will be paid to think.
You, too, will be doing something positive
by being provocative. You have been trained
with analytical skills and a certain questioning kind of skepticism that can be the
bulwark against your client's tendency to
engage in group think. just because something is done some particular way by
everybody doing deals, do not hold back
from taking a fresh look and do not be
afraid to ask questions.
The assumption that all the people
who are putting their money where their
mouths are necessarily know what they
are doing can be grossly misleading. You
are far more valuable to your client if you
play the more proactive role suggested
here, instead of just sitting back and being
a mere scrivener. You will help your client
both to seize opportunities missed by
others and to avoid previously unseen
pitfalls. And you will have a lot more fun.

mm

7. See Kurt Eichenhold, "Stock Strategy Under
Scrutiny," New York Times, Aug. 26. 1993, at Dl;
Thomas Gerdel, "New LTV Stock Drawing
Investor Interest," Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 19,
1993, at 02; and Tom Petruno, Market Beat:
Market Watch; "Gambling on the Bankrupt
Bound," Los Angeles Times, Feb. 11 , 1991 , at D5.
8. Eichenhold, supra note 7.

lif Nf RAlllATIONS
These events suggest that situations
exist where academics and regulators
have a comparative advantage over
people willing to put their money where
their mouths are. The advice of academics
is valuable especially in situations where
private arrangements were set up at a time
when no one contemplated the current

9. The reader might sensibly ask why there were
not so many short sellers of LTV stock that the
price was forced down to the value of the tidbit.
The answer appears to be that legal and ethical
concerns apparently constrained others from
acting. (Eichenhold, supra note 7 .) It might be
argued that these concerns are the real source of
the problem and that their elimination is a better
solution than the regulatory response of
suspending trading. The story, however, suggests
that there is a sufficient reservoir of poorly
informed optimists that a large number of
investors would suffer in the process of such a
price adjustment.

Merritt B. Fox joined the Michigan law
faculty in 1988. He teaches corporations,
securities regulation, corporate finance,
law and economics, international
business transactions, international
finance, and international law.
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